08 January 2012

The World's Biggest Engine of Innovation

Think of institutions that successfully foster innovation over many decades and you might put on a short list a few companies like Apple or DuPont. But I'd argue that at the top of that list would be the US Department of Defense. For many decades that government agency has developed technologies, processes and products that shape aspects of our everyday lives, including everything from the tread pattern on your shoes to the architecture of the internet that enables you to read this post.

Last Friday, the New York Times warned of the effects on innovation of a decreasing military budget, quoting my close colleague Dan Sarewitz:
Professor Sarewitz, who studies the government’s role in promoting innovation, said that the Defense Department had been more successful than other federal agencies because it is the main user of the innovations that it finances. The Department of Energy and the National Institutes of Health, which also finance large volumes of research, are not major consumers of energy or healthcare. The Pentagon, which spends billions each year on weapons, equipment and technology, has an unusually direct stake in the outcome of its research and development projects. “The central thing that distinguishes them from other agencies is that they are the customer,” Professor Sarewitz said. “You can’t pull the wool over their eyes.”

Another factor is the Pentagon’s relative insulation from politics, which has allowed it to sustain a long-term research agenda in controversial areas. No matter which party is in power, the Pentagon has continued to invest in clean-energy technology, for example, in an effort to find ways to reduce one of its largest budget items, energy costs.
The scale of investment that DOD is able to make is of course crucially important, but as alluded to by Sarewitz, it is how DOD does its business that differentiates it from almost all of civilian mission agencies (exceptions might include Agriculture and NIST). Unfortunately, discussion of R&D policies typically devolves into discussions of "how much" rather than "how." Consider how the Washington Post's Ezra Klein reacted to the NYT story:
There’s an argument health reformers occasionally face that goes something like this: Sure, America way overspends on health care. But that overspending ultimately encourages medical innovations of incalculable value. Sharp cuts to health-care spending could lead us to lose out on those innovations.

I thought of that argument while reading Binya Appelbaum’s article warning that cutting the defense budget could kill off the military’s historical role as a driver of consumer-friendly innovations. The chain of reasoning goes something like this: We funnel huge amounts of money to the military; some of that money goes to R&D; some of that R&D unexpectedly pays off for consumers; and so cutting the military budget could ultimately hurt consumers.
He argues:
[F]unding military R&D is probably an inefficient way to fund nonmilitary innovations. If what we want is R&D focused on innovations with broad applications, we should fund that R&D directly rather than hoping that some of the military’s innovations turn out to also be of use to consumers.
But to argue that R&D funding simply needs to be redirected is to miss the point -- innovation outcomes related to government R&D are a function of far more than just funding amounts. Imagine if you took the DOD R&D budget and gave it to NASA or DOE or NSF. A lot of good work would get done, no doubt, but arguably you'd have much less innovation, commercialization and societal impact.
A key reason for these differential outcomes is -- as Sarewitz suggests -- that DOD is a mission agency that innovates to serve clearly defined operational functions. To put it bluntly, if DOD fails to innovation then American soldiers die. That will focus attention.
In addition, Congressional oversight of military performance is far more rigorous than other federal agencies where R&D investments are not measured in terms of societal impacts. Not surprisingly then DOD invests far less in what it calls "basic research" than do other agencies (see figure above, DOD spends less than half on "basic research" than does NSF, but its total R&D budget is about 20 times bigger). DOD learns a lot by doing and has close relationships with contractors and others in the private sector, who depend upon DOD funding but also take DOD technologies to the marketplace in non-military applications.

Academics and others who prefer to do largely unaccountable "basic research" understandably are not big fans of the DOD model. But if a goal of federal R&D is to stimulate innovation in productive directions, then the Defense model offers much to learn from -- whatever total amount the government ultimately devotes to federal R&D.

19 comments:

Paul said...

Sorry, I'm unconvinced by this. Yes, US defence spending has resulted in technology spinoffs; it would be astonishing if a trillion dollar industry didn't.
I can see how, out of government spending, spending more on defence MIGHT result in more spinoff technologies, but I think you could make a similar argument for other sectors. Particularly as defence technology is often only exportable to 'friendly' countries.
Arguably, areas such as education and transport SHOULD have innovated much more, but can't because they are cash-starved to pay for behomoths like the DoD.
You also don't address the issue of how much a similar investment in the private sector would achieve. Spending more on defence ultimately means more taxes, which hold back private technology development.

Unless you think the U.S. is a special case, the proof of the argument is to look across developed economies for correlation between
a) technology innovation and development against defence spending as a % of GDP
b) technology innovation and development against defence spending as a % of government spending.

a) will tell you if defence spending generates more technology spinoffs than non-government spending
b) will tell you if defence spending generates more technology spinoffs than other government spending.

Anyone know of any data?

An example that I suggest disproves the thesis would be post-WW2 Japan; low defence spending but a high rate of technology innovation.

Roger Pielke, Jr. said...

-1-Paul

Thanks for the comment. The argument here is not about "defense spending" but rather DOD's approach to innovation.

Buck said...

DOD as a whole is anti-innovation. Ask any Air Force enlisted man about the Air Force Way as he personally experiences it and see if the notion of innovation is anywhere in his description. And the Air Force is the least hidebound of the services. I find it difficult to think of DOD as a unified organisation, driving innovation to keep soldiers alive. DOD is huge and there are plenty of program offices far more interested in maintaining their funding than innovating. This in particular raised my eyebrows: '“The central thing that distinguishes them from other agencies is that they are the customer,” Professor Sarewitz said. “You can’t pull the wool over their eyes.”' In 2007 and again in 2009, the welding at Newport News was faulty. http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4113502 It wasn't until the first ships were delivered back to the fleet - and leaked - that the welding issue came to light. In effect, NGNN pulled the wool over the Navy's eyes for years on the most fundamental aspects of shipbuilding. Not some esoteric field where only a few researchers understand what's going on.

Having said that, it is absolutely true that there are DOD program offices that work very hard on genuine innovation and research. The Office of Naval Research is one such office. http://youtu.be/RXuAuuR_siI

Rather than "DOD's approach to innovation" I think we would be more precise to speak of specific DOD program offices.

Harrywr2 said...

An example that I suggest disproves the thesis would be post-WW2 Japan; low defence spending but a high rate of technology innovation.

IMHO Japans 'innovation' spending budget is similar to DOD's. I.E. It is targeted to the needs of their industrial survival. The Ministry of Industry and trade controls the R&D dollars.

In the US non-defense R&D dollars tend to be controlled by the squeaky wheel.

Joshua said...

Roger -

"The Pentagon, which spends billions each year on weapons, equipment and technology, has an unusually direct stake in the outcome of its research and development projects. “"


Have you ever looked at what GAO has to say about waste in Pentagon spending? The figures are astounding.

Google Chuck Spinney.

And excerpt from a PBS interview:

***

MOYERS: He should know. For the last three decades, Spinney's job at the Pentagon has been to analyze the cost and effectiveness of America's weapons. And he says, national security is at risk because the country's not getting what we're paying for.

SPINNEY: I think it's out of control. I think a lot of people have just thrown up their hands.

MOYERS: So out of control, says Spinney, that the Pentagon can't account for billions upon billions of the dollars it's spending while its financial books border on pure fiction.

SPINNEY: We have an accounting system that is unauditable. Every year they do an audit and the inspector general would issue a report saying we have to wave the audit requirements, issue a disclaimer of opinion because we can't balance the books. We can't tell you how the money got spent.

MOYERS: Case in point: since 1995, the General Accounting Office has ranked the Defense Department's financial management among the worst in the federal government "… on [the] GAO's list of high-risk areas vulnerable to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement."

What's more, in fiscal year 2000, the Defense Department's own inspector general found that the Pentagon could not account for more than $1 trillion — trillion with a "t."

Spinney says it amounts to a constitutional crisis.

***

Roger Pielke, Jr. said...

-5-Joshua

No doubt, and troubling, but what does that have to do with R&D policy in DOD? Thanks!

Joshua said...

- 6 Roger

So you think it's likely that an unauditable system for accounting applies only to spending on weaponry and not spending/policy for R&D?

Roger Pielke, Jr. said...

-7-Joshua

Thanks, but since you are the one making the claim, the burden of proof is upon you to show that the issues that you raise apply systematically to DOD's R&D.

Perhaps they do, but you haven't shown that. Given DOD's track record in innovation I have a hard time believing that mismanagement iof R&D resources a big issue, but if you have evidence to the contrary do provide it. Thanks!

Roger Pielke, Jr. said...

-3-Buck

Thanks, I agree that drilling down in more detail makes good sense. Along those lines, here is a recent paper by a former student of mine, nat Logar, looking at NRL, NIST and ARS in USDA:

http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/publications/special/sip_logar.pdf

Joshua said...

- 8 - Roger

I hate "burden of proof" arguments. They are essentially unwinnable, and IMO, mostly bloviation. You have claimed a superior level of efficiency in DOD R&D spending. It seems to me that the burden of proof is on you to prove that there isn't waste. Waddya know. For you to write this post and then seem uninterested in validating the claims seems rather odd to me.

Anyway, here - you might find this relevant.

***---

The auditors said the biggest problems occurred when the Pentagon changed the capabilities it sought or started production before critical technologies were ready.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/30/business/30military.html

---***

That strikes me a inefficiency in how funds are used for R&D. IMO, you're creating a false dichotomy that doesn't stand up to reasonable scrutiny (i.e., the DOD has a lot of problems with accountability in one area, and likely they'd have similar problems elsewhere).

Thanks.

Joshua said...

- 9 - Roger.

OK. It seems that we have moved closer to agreement.

Roger Pielke, Jr. said...

-10-Joshua

"I hate "burden of proof" arguments"

Well, have you considered reversing your null hypothesis? (Joke;-)

I'll do a post soon on our special journal issue on science and innovation policy, stay tuned, that'll be a good place to get down into more details for those interested. Thanks!

Matt said...

Joshua,

I don't see that your argument rebuts anything Roger has said. For my part, I believe that Roger is correct with respect to innovation, and agree with you that we waste billions of dollars each year via the DOD.

I think that says a lot about other places where you might look for innovation from the government, and certainly about what you get from government spending on a massive (and, frankly non-massive) scale in general.

If the goal were simply innovation, then I'd say that government spending was probably going to be wasted. Of course, there's never a guarantee when trying to innovate, so any attempt may end up being wasted.

The real point here is that despite all of the nonsense that comes out of the DOD procurement process (and rest assured, a lot of it is a direct result of attempts to keep it under control and avoid waste and corruption!), at the end of the day, various parts of the DOD do have a mission, and that keeps the rest of the behemoth on track enough to produce some nifty innovations.

But it's a nice side effect, not a primary goal.

Joshua said...

12 - Roger -

"Well, have you considered reversing your null hypothesis? (Joke;-)"


Being a joke aside, I'm not sure I understand what that means here.

My point is that arguing about "burden of proof" seems (often) to be arguing (defensively) about arguing rather than discussing the topic at hand. I think of it as a form of ad hom.

If the question is discussing the efficiency or waste in DOD R&D, the "burden of proof" is a non factor. It makes "proving" something the goal of the discussion as opposed to examining all data as objectively as possible.

Actually, I think it relates to your most recent post.

Roger Pielke, Jr. said...

-14-Joshua

Rest assured, when I talk about "burden of proof" I mean it as written, no ad homs intended or implied. Let's move on, shall we?

Thanks;-)

Joshua said...

Done.

Gerard Harbison said...

I think Roger is grossly overoptimistic about DoD research. I'm reminded of a contract I had (pre 9/11) to determine if a certain component of anthrax spores could be detected by magnetic resonance. I pointed out to the DoD that while I could certainly design an NMR detector to pick up a suitcase full of anthrax spores, there is no way I or anyone else could detect them at the Army's proposed threshold (1 spore per cubic meter under battlefield conditions). I said this was at least 10 orders of magnitude away from being feasible. The DoD guy replied with the memorable words "This is at the Army. It doesn't have to work".

After I'd done the measurements and presented them at the workshop, I listened to the other presentations. Every other proposed method was as goofy and unfeasible as the one they wanted me to check. The method I told them to try -- fast PCR -- wasn't even one they were checking out.

MIKE MCHENRY said...

Having worked for a company that did R&D for the military I have to say I agree with the premise. First of all it's much more about the D than the R. Which is the opposite with University work. The military is very much about taking known technology and developing into applications. This technology is often either too expensive or too new for the private sector. Yes, there are failures but compared to work done at universities widely successful. The work is often done at industrial R&D labs who are use to developing products. I don't know how development a civilian model, because you need a customer.

Christopher said...

[F]unding military R&D is probably an inefficient way to fund nonmilitary innovations. If what we want is R&D focused on innovations with broad applications, we should fund that R&D directly rather than hoping that some of the military’s innovations turn out to also be of use to consumers.

The flaw in this argument is that it's rarely obvious which innovations will have an impact outside of their originally intended purpose. Uses obvious to us now were not so obvious at the time it was developed.

Post a Comment